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Stephen V Ward 
Abstract 
Professional visits allowed specialist groups such as urban planners to learn about Soviet 
thinking, practice and life. This paper examines the communication and learning which 
occurred during two specific visits in 1936 and 1957/8. The paper shows the visual nature of 
planning assisted non-verbal communication and learning. It also highlights the impacts of 
different political contexts and the forms of visit, particularly between one-off trips (1936) 
and reciprocal exchange arrangements (1957/8). In 1936 the bold and comprehensive Soviet 
approach to planning was admired, bolstering domestic British arguments for a stronger 
planning system. By 1957/8, however, the balance had shifted so that the visit to the USSR 
served more sumbolic, quasi-diplomatic and touristic functions. Despite a relatively warm 
and informal encounter, British planners now found less in the USSR to admire 
professionally though Soviet planners were eager to investigate and apply British planning 
achievements. 
Introduction  
Western visits to the former USSR by specialist groups in technical, cultural, artistic, 
educational and other professional fields were important in developing knowledge and 
understanding of Soviet thinking, practices and life. The visits occurred on both a unilateral, 
one-off basis or as part of reciprocal exchange arrangements. They drew on the knowledge 
and experience of organisations and wider networks which existed on both sides to promote 
and facilitate contacts on a non-governmental and non-business basis. The actual experiences 
of the visits varied, depending on their primary focus. Many artistic and cultural visits took 
the form of performances, exhibitions or lecture tours by visiting groups. Others in more 
formal professional and technical fields were primarily concerned with what political 
scientists have termed ‘cross-national learning’ (Rose, 2005). This involves looking abroad 
not merely to gather exotic knowledge or even copy foreign experiences but rather to assess 
how far programmes effective elsewhere might be adapted for a new setting and ineffective 
approaches avoided..  It is these learning visits that are the concern here, specifically in what 
is broadly termed urban planning, embracing town planning, architecture, housing and related 
aspects of urban policy.  
This paper examines the communication and learning processes typical of such 
encounters by comparing specific visits during two particular ‘high points’ of interest in 
Anglo-Soviet contact. The first example was a four-week visit to Moscow in 1936 by British 
urban planning and governance experts. The second was a 1957/8 pair of exchange visits 
(lasting 19 and 22 days respectively) of town planners from each country. Both examples 
were relatively well documented. This allows a critical examination of how changing 
political and cultural contexts, the form and structure of visits themselves and the visitors’ 
own perspectives affected communication and learning. 
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Barriers to genuine Anglo-Soviet communication were substantial. Cultural and 
linguistic differences had always been substantial and post-Revolutionary ideological 
differences and mutual suspicions were profound. It was unlikely that there could ever be 
learning connections in urban planning as close as those between Britain and nearby 
European countries or the wider Anglophone world. Even so, some urban planning contacts 
had developed before 1917, evident in the development of a Russian garden city organisation 
whose members communicated with the movement in Britain (Cooke, 1977).  
The early USSR certainly fascinated some urban planners in the West, especially 
those with left-wing sympathies (Ward, 2012). There was a strong sense that it was a 
uniquely bold and comprehensive experiment in planned development, especially so in the 
1930s and 1940s. Later, during the 1950s and early 1960s there was also a Western feeling, 
not just on the left, that the Soviet Union might well overtake the United States as the world’s 
largest economy (Gunther, 1958: 406-8). Its prowess in space exploration by the later 1950s 
certainly showed it ahead of its major rival in some key sectors. This perspective suggested a 
value in studying other aspects of the Soviet system.  In urban planning, as in other fields, it 
could not simply be ignored.  
Both sides in the post-Stalin period also saw cultural, professional, technical and 
educational contacts of all kinds as having a more general role, lessening the chill of the Cold 
War.  Finally, we should not underestimate the significance of plain curiosity; to groups such 
as urban planners on each side, the other represented an unknown land. Visiting was a way of 
satisfying that curiosity, potentially also to gain knowledge of value to one’s own profession. 
Moreover, because of the comparative rarity of such visits, publicising travellers’ tales and 
distilling lessons to be learned potentially allowed travellers to gain professional and wider 
status. 
Two distinct phases of Anglo-Soviet contact in the urban planning field are 
identifiable, the first during 1931-9. Visits in these years were unilateral, involving British 
parties or occasionally individuals travelling to the Soviet Union. There were very few Soviet 
visits in the opposite direction and none forming part of exchange arrangements. All visits 
ceased shortly after the outbreak of war in the West. Despite great British interest in Soviet 
reconstruction planning in the 1940s, no group visits specific to this field occurred while 
Stalin ruled. From 1953, however, a new period of contact opened, based from the outset on 
the principle of mutual exchange. There were far more Soviet visits to Britain in the urban 
planning field than ever before. Although affected by periodic crises in Soviet relations with 
the West, the Khrushchev ‘thaw’ era 1953-64 was a particularly fruitful one for Anglo-Soviet 
contacts in the urban planning field.  
Anglo-Soviet interchanges in the 1930s 
Previous work on the more general phenomenon of cultural, technical, professional and 
similar non-trade visits to the Soviet Union has largely focused on the first period.  A few 
Western visitors went even in the very early years after 1917 and numbers grew during the 
later 1920s. German and American visitors were the most common in urban planning (and 
3 
 
other fields). Some were hired or subsequently became involved in working to plan Soviet 
industrial and urban expansion. The brigade of largely German urban planners from Frankfurt 
led by Ernst May which went to the USSR from 1930-33 was the best known group, though 
there were many other individuals (Kopp, 1990; Flierl, 2011).  
There were a few British visitors at this time, although until 1931 none were urban 
planners. It was only in July of that year that the first British urban planning visitor, the 
architect Clough Williams-Ellis, went to the Soviet Union. His wife, Amabel, a children’s 
author with strong Communist sympathies, had been an earlier visitor and she contrived an 
invitation for her husband (UK TNA KV 2/784). More visiting parties followed, all seeing 
something of Soviet urban planning and several focused exclusively on architecture and 
planning.  Most visitors returned impressed, even ‘starry-eyed’, and were happy to share their 
experiences.  
Although no British planners ever worked in the USSR, the contacts were still 
surprising considering deep suspicions of Comintern by conservative and even moderate 
opinion in Britain during the 1920s (Ward, 2015). In the 1930s, steadily growing knowledge 
of Soviet domestic repression also contrasted with the high regard in which many intelligent 
and humane Western visitors clearly held the USSR. There have been many attempts to 
explain this paradox. Some have stressed the naïve gullibility of visitors, aided by the 
cynicism of Western journalists based in Moscow (Muggeridge, 1972: 205-76). The latter 
enjoyed a pampered lifestyle if they promoted favourable images of Soviet achievements.  
Others have seen in Westerners’ Soviet admiration a quest for a more perfectly 
rational society, where scientific expertise and planning, rather than private interest, shaped 
public decision making (Caute, 1988). Another interpretation posits a quasi-religious search 
for the new certainties and hopes of a secular Utopia (Hollander, 1981). Such sentiments 
were all the more potent for generations shaped by the Great War and its aftermath, with 
many losing faith in traditional ideologies and institutions.  The 1930s realities of worldwide 
depression, mass unemployment, the rise of Fascism and seeming impotence of capitalist 
parliamentary democracies also caused many to look in hope to Moscow. 
Yet there is an important silence in these older accounts, concerning the Soviet role in 
these links. Recent research has used Russian sources to show how Soviet agencies actively 
cultivated Western contacts. The key agency was VOKS (Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo 
Kul’turnoi Sviazi s zagranitsei - All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries), created as a formal entity in 1925 (Stern, 2007: 86-131; David-Fox, 2012: 28-97). 
This body’s principal aim was to enhance Soviet ‘soft power’ by facilitating and stage 
managing its international cultural, scientific and professional relations to foster positive 
impressions of the USSR in other countries.  
An important way of achieving  this was by promoting national ‘friendship societies’, 
the first being the German Society of Friends of the New Russia, founded in Berlin in 1923. 
The London-based Society for Cultural Relations between the British Commonwealth and the 
USSR (usually known as the Society for Cultural Relations or SCR) followed in June 1924. 
4 
 
Similar organisations soon appeared in other Western countries. Despite their common 
format, however, some were much more arms of VOKS than others. The British SCR was a 
relatively autonomous body which did not slavishly follow the Moscow line (David-Fox, 
2012: especially 82-3).  
VOKS, however, played a central role in controlling the flow and nature of 
information about the Soviet Union which reached foreigners. Through its national friendship 
networks, it supplied information and publications, often in translations (of varying quality), 
and responded (sometimes erratically) to requests for specific information. Visits by 
foreigners were carefully orchestrated, ensuring the Soviet experience was showcased in as 
positive a manner as possible. Part of the approach involved encouraging criticisms and 
seeking advice. While there was probably some genuine basis for this, it also served to flatter 
the vanity of visitors and encourage their complicity in the great Soviet project to build a 
socialist society.  
In 1929 a second Soviet organisation concerned with foreign visitors, Intourist, was 
formed. Essentially a tourist agency, it was also to some extent a rival of VOKS.  It shared 
the general intention to show the Soviet system in positive terms but with the aim also of 
earning Western currency. VOKS remained important for more specialist contacts but its role 
was certainly diminished. Thus interpreters, except for the most specialist visits, now had to 
come from Intourist. 
This more recent work has allowed a more balanced appreciation of Anglo-Soviet 
contacts during this period. Whether emphasis is on Soviet stage-managing or on the 
particular expectations and/or naivety with which Westerners viewed and understood the 
Soviet scene, however, does not affect a more basic point: The nature of the contacts have 
been viewed as ideologically tainted, with little scope for ‘real’ and accurate understanding. 
The 1936 Moscow Visit 
The first visit being examined occurred in September 1936 to conduct a research 
investigation into the Mossoviet, the Moscow City Government. The outcome was published 
in a 1937 book called Moscow in the Making (Simon et al., 1937) with related lectures and 
newspaper articles (eg Manchester Guardian, 1937a, 1937b). Apart from its very specific 
focus, the visit was similar to many other Soviet visits during the 1930s. Lasting four weeks 
(the normal duration of a Soviet visa) it was arranged by the SCR, with, in this case, personal 
facilitation from the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky. VOKS and Intourist gave 
their usual assistance at the Moscow end, identifying specific people to interview, sites to 
visit and providing interpreters (Simon et al., 1937: v-vi). The visit was a one-off event 
though, coincidentally, a Moscow delegation led by Nicolai Bulganin, then Mossoviet 
Chairman, was visiting London (and Paris) at almost exactly the same time (Times, 1936). 
However the groups never met and their trips were not part of an exchange arrangement.  
The members of the British group were fairly typical of many others who visited the 
USSR during the 1930s. The leader, instigator and funder of the visit and book was Sir Ernest 
Simon (Stocks, 1963), a successful Manchester industrialist of progressive views who was 
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active in public life in the city. He had two brief spells as a Liberal MP though later joined 
the Labour Party. Another was Simon’s wife, Shena, who shared her husband’s commitment 
to public life and progressive causes, though was already a Labour Party member, with a 
special interest in education (Jones, 2004).  The third member was a London School of 
Economics academic, William A. Robson, an expert in constitutional law and local 
government (Crick, 2004). The final member was a Manchester economist, John Jewkes, an 
expert on industrial and regional matters. Accompanying them was one of the Simons’ sons 
and a nephew, whose exact identities are unclear (Ricketts, 2004). They took no active part 
but it is relevant that one son was already in 1936 a Communist and the other (probably the 
one on the trip) joined in 1937. (The parents were not best pleased.)  
The dominant though not unanimous perspective of the visiting group proper was that 
of the Fabian Society, essentially that socialism could be realised gradually through 
democratic, progressive, efficient, informed and rational governance. Ernest and Shena 
Simon were friends of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, intellectual leaders of the Fabians, and 
Ernest’s wealth helped fund many projects to advance these ideas. Robson had a very similar 
perspective. Yet Jewkes’s outlook was never Fabian and can be termed ‘updated Manchester 
School’, i.e. pragmatic regarding state intervention when market processes were in crisis but 
remaining at heart a classical liberal. Subsequently, from the later 1940s, he became a 
pioneering advocate of economic neo-liberalism and fierce critic of economic planning 
(Jewkes, 1948). 
Despite Jewkes’s somewhat different perspective, the principal inspiration of the 1936 
visit and ensuing book was the Webbs’ own two volume work Soviet Communism: A New 
Civilisation? (Webb and Webb, 1935).  The Webbs also helped more directly by making 
suggestions about the investigation, questions, matters to be probed etc (pp. v-vi). Simon saw 
the project as supplementing the Webbs’ work by focusing on the governance and planning 
of the showpiece Soviet city following the 1935 General Plan for the Reconstruction of the 
City of Moscow. 
Many details of the visit such as the exact itinerary, the identities of individuals 
encountered and how evidence was recorded and assimilated remain vague. Some Soviet 
printed material was secured but with great difficulty, even during the visit, and was certainly 
not a significant source. It is, however, clear that meetings with senior Mossoviet and central 
officials were very important. Sometimes these encounters involved all visitors while others 
were conducted individually. However, it is not known what was said by whom in these 
presentations and subsequent questioning. It may be assumed that their significance was 
substantial since they typically lasted 2-4 hours though, since none of the visitors spoke 
Russian, translation must have accounted for at least half of this time.  
Further information came from visits to inspect and observe activities at relevant sites 
such as schools or housing. The visitors clearly spoke to local residents, albeit many in 
various local supervisory roles. There was some use of the opinions of anonymous Russian 
professionals working at, for example, construction sites. The experiences and opinions of 
unnamed Western foreigners living or working in Moscow were also utilised (Simon et al., 
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1937: 161, 179). The rigid inflexibilities of Moscow life were amply displayed even in the 
otherwise comfortable hotel where the party stayed.  More significantly, the visitors saw and, 
to some extent, experienced aspects of more ordinary Soviet life for themselves.  
How they recorded and made sense of the information they uncovered is not fully 
clear, though it would seem that detailed notes were taken. Ernest Simon at one point 
mentions making notes in public places during street walks, sometimes facing challenges 
from security personnel (Simon et al., 1937: 224). During the visit the group met each night 
to discuss their respective findings and take stock of events which they had all experienced. 
Later, they also compared their own findings with the impressions of other visitors, not just 
the Webbs. Thus Ernest Simon (Simon et al., 1937: 183) contrasted his views with those of 
Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress who published his own 
account in 1936 (Citrine, 1936).  
These four weeks were a time of serious hard work and the visitors seem to have 
resisted purely touristic sight-seeing. Ernest Simon may incidentally have pursued some 
business interests, visiting a flour mill (one of the Simon companies specialised in 
manufacturing milling machinery) (Simon et al., 1937: 224), but this was probably a ‘local 
industry’, controlled by the Mossoviet. Some of the party, though it is not known who, 
undertook short side visits to Leningrad (St Petersburg) and Kharkov (Simon et al., 1937: v.) 
It is not clear what purpose these trips served but the two cities are referred to briefly for 
comparison in a few chapters. 
The book which followed was well received and became a respected English language 
source on Soviet city planning and governance. In retrospect, its judgements might be seen as 
too laudatory in some respects but were far from being the most fulsome. At any rate, it was 
the most substantial work in this field to result from any Soviet visit during this period and 
was a significant contribution to a rapidly evolving debate about policy directions for urban 
planning in Britain in the late 1930s and 1940s (Ward, 2015: xxi-xxiv). 
Anglo-Soviet interchanges during the Khrushchev ‘thaw’ 
Until recently, less attention has been given to foreign cultural and similar relations during 
the Khrushchev ‘thaw’ period than those during the 1930s, though this is now changing. It is, 
however, first necessary to understand the period which preceded it. Following the hiatus of 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939-41, there was an upsurge of British interest in the USSR until 
the onset of the Cold War in 1947-8 (Northedge and Wells, 1982: 151-4; Keeble, 1990: 28-
31). The common sense of wartime struggle against Hitler and shared urban planning 
challenges of reconstruction were strong unifying themes. The ‘Bond of Friendship’ 
(twinning) agreement between Coventry and Stalingrad in 1944 was symptomatic of this new 
mood. Previous suspicions of the SCR diminished as British professional bodies, pressure 
groups and government ministries now eagerly sought its knowledge of Soviet reconstruction 
planning (Ward, 2012). Yet specialist visits on the pre-war pattern were no longer possible, 
restricting how far British interest could be refreshed. Soviet misgivings during the early 
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post-war years further inhibited contacts and after 1947 Anglo-Soviet relations generally 
worsened.  
By 1952-3, however, there were signs of renewed interest and, following a Soviet 
invitation, a group of British architects and planners visited under SCR auspices in 1953, with 
a smaller Soviet group coming to Britain the following year (SCR, 1954). As the Khrushchev 
regime became more established, however, further opportunities for greatly improved 
relations with the West opened (Keeble, 1990: 35-8; van Oudenaren, 1991: 283-96). With 
this came more exchange visits in professional, cultural and similar fields. Improved cultural 
and related exchanges were positively discussed at the July 1955 Geneva summit of the 
leaders of the ‘big four’ (USSR, USA, UK and France).  
The Soviet desire for better relations with the West reflected both its continuing 
concern to promote more sympathetic understanding of the USSR and a newer desire for 
specific knowledge from Western countries. Housing, urban planning and construction had 
particular significance, since Khrushchev was eager to raise the generally poor standards of 
Soviet housing (Smith, 2010: 59-99). Here Western expertise in industrialised housing 
systems and in the planning of new satellite towns attracted particular Soviet interest. These 
topics were prominent in Soviet visits to several Western countries (notably France, Western 
Germany and Scandinavia) from an early stage. It was also the case for Soviet links with 
Britain. For example, there were Anglo-Soviet exchange visits of housing and building 
specialists in July and September 1955 promoted by the Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) (UK TNA 128/1; Smith, 2010: 75-6). It is also significant that the British government 
immediately followed Khrushchev’s visit to Britain in April 1956 with a return visit the 
following month by the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys (also 
responsible for urban planning).   
As this Soviet window opened, a new basis for Anglo-Soviet cultural diplomacy was 
also created. On the British side, the main concern was again to marginalise the SCR and 
other friendship societies, particularly the British-Soviet Friendship Society. They were again 
perceived as politically untrustworthy, liable to represent Britain too negatively to Soviet 
visitors and be too positive about the USSR. A Soviet Relations Committee of the British 
Council was therefore established in May 1955 as an official agency without communist 
connotations to organise visits to and receive visitors from the USSR (UK TNA BW 2/250). 
Its head was Christopher Mayhew, formerly a junior minister in the Attlee Labour 
Government charged with combatting Soviet propaganda during the early Cold War 
(Mayhew, 1998).  
Shortly after these new arrangements appeared, however, Soviet suppression of the 
Hungarian Revolution in late 1956 triggered a severing of links by the British government. 
Yet this proved only temporary, partly because of fears that friendship societies would 
otherwise regain their dominance. For its part the Soviet Union initially continued to work 
through old friendship networks, annoying the British government and the British Council. 
Quite soon, however, the Soviet government also began to create its own new framework 
(van Oudenaren, 1991: 287-9). A new State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
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Countries was established in 1957 to negotiate new exchange agreements. These were then 
implemented by a new Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries which replaced VOKS in early 1958. New Soviet societies were also 
created for cultural relations with individual countries which together comprised the Union. 
In part this remodelling was simply a cosmetic exercise. Yet it also reflected a 
growing sense that aging pre-war friendship organisations and memberships might not be the 
optimal framework to engage with the best of current Western thinking and practice or, 
conversely, to represent the best on the Soviet side (van Oudenaren, 1991: 288). This was 
especially so in Britain where the Communist Party had declining credibility in cultural and 
professional circles compared to the 1930s and 1940s. There were also (well justified) fears 
by individuals that Soviet involvements via the old pro-Communist friendship societies 
would jeopardise their opportunities to work the United States, then becoming a far more 
lucrative prospect (Ward, 2012: 510). Therefore it made sense for Soviet authorities to 
concede Western demands for a less overtly ideological framework for cultural diplomacy. 
The 1957-8 Anglo-Soviet urban planning exchange visits 
The 1957-8 visits were organized as this new framework was emerging (Cook, Ward and 
Ward, 2014).  The idea came from the Sandys Ministerial visit of May 1956 and specific 
arrangements began at the Vienna World Congress of the International Federation of Housing 
and Town Planning (IFHTP), in July (HALS, H17).  On the British side the key figure was 
Frederic J. Osborn, Chairman of the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), the 
foremost British planning pressure group, and IFHTP Vice President. On the Soviet side, his 
equivalent was Mr. A. Koudriavtsev of the USSR State Committee on Construction Affairs 
who headed the Soviet delegation in Vienna. 
The TCPA organised annual overseas study tours and had long harboured hopes of a 
Soviet visit, so far without success. Now both sides were keen to proceed. Arrangements 
were delayed by the Hungarian crisis but eventually, six Soviet planners arrived in London in 
September 1957.  The delegation included the heads of planning, architecture and building 
construction bodies in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk and Kiev along with the acting director of 
the Academy of Building and Architecture of the USSR. It was led by Mr. S. I. Kolesnikov, 
director of the USSR State Committee on Construction Affairs, who also accompanied the 
1958 party throughout their Soviet tour the following year. The Soviet Relations Committee 
of the British Council provided the official English-Russian interpreter and there was also 
Soviet embassy interpretation support. 
In consultation with the Soviet Relations Committee and Koudriavtsev (who did not 
attend the tour), the TCPA itinerary focused principally on post-war urban reconstruction and 
New Town development.  Attracting great local media interest, the visitors went to London, 
Stratford-upon-Avon, Oxford, Birmingham, Coventry, Stafford, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Preston, Edinburgh and Glasgow – and rural areas of the Cotswolds, Loch Lomond and the 
Highlands.  Also featured were the New Towns of Hemel Hempstead, Welwyn Garden City, 
Glenrothes and East Kilbride.  The visitors met many government officials, mayors, planners, 
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architects, New Town Development Corporation officials and university lecturers. Some who 
they met comprised the group they welcomed a few months later in the USSR. These 
members of the 1958 delegation accompanied the 1957 Soviet visitors for sections of the 
visit. 
In May 1958, the British visitors arrived in Moscow to be met by members of the 
previous year’s delegation. The party comprised the leader Osborn, Richard Edmonds 
(Chairman of the London County Council Town Planning Committee, a Labour Party 
member) together with Henry Wells (Chairman of Hemel Hempstead New Town 
Development Corporation), H. Myles Wright (Lever Professor in University of Liverpool’s 
Department of Civic Design), E.G.S. Elliot (Chief Technical Officer in the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government) and Dennis W. Riley (Chief Planning Officer of 
Staffordshire County Council). Like the Soviet delegation the previous year, these were all 
senior urban planning figures, none speaking the language of the visited country. An official 
Soviet interpreter was provided, supported by a British Embassy official who gave much 
additional support. 
The places visited were all west of the Urals, beginning in Moscow, then Leningrad, 
Kiev, Sochi, Gagra, Krasnodar, Stalingrad (now Volgograd) before returning to Moscow.  
The pattern echoed that in the UK, visiting planning offices, city centres, existing housing 
areas, construction sites, and places of ‘historic interest’ and ‘natural beauty’.  They saw 
plans for three proposed satellite or ‘sputnik’ towns around Leningrad – Sosnovaya Polyana, 
Otradnoye and Gorsky [all sic](Edmonds, 1958).  Outside the big cities, they visited 
collective farms, coastal resort developments in Sochi, the USSR Agricultural and Industrial 
Exhibition in Moscow and the ongoing Volga Dam project.   
They also inspected housing plans and models and visited a prefabrication factory and 
actual construction sites for the new Soviet housing drive.  This very important programme 
drew partly on similar construction systems in France (especially), Scandinavia and Britain 
(Dremaite and Petrulis, 2013). Already Soviet architects and construction engineers had 
begun to inspect Western techniques, (for example the July 1955 ECE visit to Britain noted 
above). The physical outcome was the characteristic Khrushchev-era apartments built in their 
millions, mainly in five-storey blocks throughout the USSR (Ruble, 1993).  
Unlike the pervasive seriousness of the 1936 visit, lighter activities within the 
programme counterbalanced earnest profession inquiry, having also featured in the 1957 
Soviet visit to Britain. Within the Soviet Union, the ‘social programme’ included several 
visits to theatres, the circus and a Moscow trip to watch a diplomatically convenient 1-1 draw 
in a Soviet Union-England football international. There were also numerous receptions and 
dinners where visitors met fellow professionals and officials in less formal settings. 
Also unlike the 1936 visit, there was no single major publication for that of 1958. 
However five group members produced their own account(s). Most ambitious was Edmonds 
who, following several newspaper articles, published a book. Osborn wrote newspaper 
articles, a more thoughtful piece in the TCPA journal and gave several talks. Wells, a 
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chartered surveyor by first profession, gave a lecture to that professional body, published in 
its journal. Similarly Riley addressed his professional body, the Town Planning Institute 
(Riley, 1959). Wright wrote a long article in the prestigious scholarly planning journal, Town 
Planning Review (Wright, 1958). Nothing published or unpublished has been identified by 
Elliot but it seems likely that, at the very least, he wrote an internal report for fellow Ministry 
officials.  
Comparing Anglo-Soviet communication in 1936 and 1957-8 
What then can be said about the communications aspects of these visits? The most striking 
point is how much the exchange arrangements altered the tone of the 1958 visit, compared to 
1936. The 1958 visit benefited by being the second ‘leg’ of the exchange, since the Osborn 
party had already met Kolesnikov and their hosts for different sections of the visit. The effect 
was immediate; as Edmonds wrote of the party’s arrival – ‘…we are in the arms of friends, 
friends I say because of their smiling and warm-hearted welcome, but through the memory, 
too, of a busy week in London in September last…’ (Edmonds, 1958: 10). This sense of 
friendship contrasted with the greater formality of 1936 when visitors were received cordially 
but in the context of the matter in hand (Simon et al., 1937: v-vi). There were fewer 
opportunities for informal contacts and social bonding than in 1957-8. 
Yet greater warmth could not overcome more obvious communication barriers. In 
both 1936 and 1958 verbal and written communications were filtered through interpreters, 
clearly limiting the quantity (and almost certainly the quality) of information that could be 
orally communicated. This was particularly so in 1936 when very little printed information 
was available. However, the essentially visual nature of much urban planning activity was 
helpful on both visits, with non-written texts such as plans and models helpful in 
understanding planning intentions (though less so actual achievements).  
Site visits to view living conditions, developments in construction and recently 
completed projects were important. In 1958 many colour photographs could be taken to keep 
memories fresh and be used subsequently in lectures and publications. This was, at best, a 
minor feature of the 1936 visit with no photographs from the visit appearing either in the 
book or related publications and lectures. The capabilities of portable cameras and film in 
amateur hands were also somewhat less in 1936 than in 1958. Yet by 1936 it was certainly 
possible to acquire high quality Soviet photographs, albeit selective in their portrayals, of 
many subjects, especially so in Moscow, the showpiece Soviet city. From 1930, many 
regularly appeared in The USSR in Construction, an attractive large format foreign language 
illustrated magazine highlighting Soviet achievements. Only one appeared in the book, 
however. This was the frontispiece showing a model of the colossal proposed (though never 
realised) Palace of the Soviets on the site of the demolished Cathedral of Christ the Saviour 
(now rebuilt).   
The explanation for the lack of photographs may perhaps lie more in the essentially 
social scientific disciplinary interests of the visitors, happier with written texts and statistical 
tables than images.  Yet there is no doubt that photography was more constrained on these 
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earlier visits. Other accounts of 1930s visits refer to camera use being restricted and in at 
least one case an errant British architectural photographer was temporarily detained. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, even note-taking in public places could easily attract security 
attention, especially if this was outside the formal programme rather than when the group was 
with Soviet minders.  
There is no evidence of this on the 1958 visit. By that stage, of course, a wider Soviet 
public, certainly in professional activities such as architecture, planning and construction, 
would regularly use cameras, professionally and privately. The 1957 Soviet party in Britain 
was reported by one newspaper as being ‘draped with cameras’ (Lancashire Evening Post, 
1957). At any rate, the 1958 British visitors did not, according to Wells (1959: 374). ‘…feel 
that we were only being allowed to see “what was good for us” although naturally the 
Russians wanted to show us those things that they were most proud.’  Another visitor 
(Edmonds, 1958: 48) described ‘…wander[ing] at will through the city [of Leningrad] 
unaccompanied and unfettered in every way, and certainly not followed.’ Yet he also 
understood that ‘…in a full programme the chances for wandering at will are naturally 
limited. Photography is also unfettered; but the sensible traveller does not take pictures of 
bridges and industrial installations. If the point did arise his guide would probably insist on 
the visitor’s right to take the pictures’ (Edmonds, 1958: 48). 
Of course, all visits of this kind to all countries are to some extent managed events, 
where the knowledge that can be gained is largely structured by its organisers and 
possibilities of accessing random information correspondingly curtailed. Moreover incidental 
factors such as travel arrangements could compound this; as Osborn commented ‘VIP travel 
could give unbalanced impressions’ (HALS, C1: 2). On a day-to-day basis, both parties 
travelled by Zim automobiles to visited sites, limiting the extent to which they could see 
ordinary life at close quarters. This was more so during the 1936 visit when motor cars 
themselves were extremely rare. The position in 1958 was less stark but even then to be 
chauffeured in a Zim was a signifier of moderate importance (if not quite as elevated as 
travelling in a Zis limousine) (Wells, 1959: 378).  
More significant, however, was the extent to which visiting groups were able to exert 
any control over what they were shown. In 1936, Ernest Simon reported that some requests to 
visit particular sites were plainly ignored. When they passed construction sites on the 
Moscow-Volga canal where prisoner labour, corralled by guards with fixed bayonets, was 
being used, requests to stop the car were denied (Simon et al, 1937: 224-5). Other distortions 
could be more subtle.  For example, Ernest Simon commented that, despite being allowed to 
see many Moscow flats and the high intensity of their occupation, what must have been quite 
common family situations were never shown to him.  
The 1958 party, by contrast, was less aware of any such restrictions, distortions or 
obvious gaps. This probably reflected several things. Objectively the Soviet Union was a less 
repressive state within its own boundaries than it had been in 1936, especially so within its 
European core. The 1958 visit was also generally far more relaxed and occasioned very 
generous hospitality which may itself have dulled any critical intent the visitors may have 
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had. Consciously or unconsciously the visitors also appear to have absorbed the notion that 
they had a quasi-diplomatic role. Osborn (1958a: 8) reported that ‘…our mission, being 
technical, we did not discuss political issues.’  For their part, their hosts were certainly aware 
that they should emphasise Soviet desires for peace. This was something visiting parties in all 
fields experienced over many years (van Oudenaren, 1991: 295). The 1958 visitors were, 
however, amongst the first to experience it and clearly reciprocated. Again from Osborn: 
‘propaganda was not entirely absent – there were of course pleas, which on both sides were 
obviously sincere, for peace and better understanding – but tendentious and controversial 
international issues never obtruded’ (Osborn, 1958b: 309).  
As might be expected, the quality of communication in relation to urban planning 
matters appears to have been good on both the 1936 and 1958 visits. The visitors in both 
cases gained a relatively clear view of the formal plans, policies and programmes, of what, in 
other words, was going to be achieved. In relation to housing for example, the appalling scale 
of Moscow’s overcrowding was also in general terms clear from statistical evidence. But, 
especially in 1936, it was less easy for visitors to gain a detailed sense of existing conditions 
and of how quickly present aspirations and proposals would be realised.  
Ernest Simon went to some lengths to investigate actual housing conditions, to see the 
human experiences that lay behind these figures.  Yet although he reckoned to have seen 
inside over fifty flats of various types, he realised that these excluded the most seriously 
overcrowded families: ‘…though there were often three or four adults living together in a 
room, never once did I find more than two children. Where the large families live remained a 
mystery’ (Simon et al, 1937: 147).  He estimated that roughly half of Moscow families lived 
at less than 3 square metres per head in so-called grade IV accommodation.  However, ‘I did 
not see any of these grade IV houses; they are not normally shown to visitors, and 
unfortunately owing to lack of time I did not insist on seeing them.’ (Simon et al, 1937: 153). 
Nevertheless he built an impressionistic picture of the worst overcrowding in other ways, 
including walking outside in the evening in poorer districts of the city. Through lighted 
windows, he was able to see barrack-style worker accommodation with twenty or more 
people to a large dormitory room. Anecdotal evidence was also used. 
The 1958 party was perhaps less concerned than Simon with the social dimensions of 
actual housing conditions, being more interested in their relation to wider planning issues. 
Well aware of the extraordinary Soviet housing drive then underway and the real 
improvements this was bringing, the group still noted average space standards, even in new 
properties, remained below contemporary British norms. The visitors appear not to have 
experienced difficulties in seeing what they wished of housing conditions but their main 
comments were about the rather austere flatted accommodation being provided and the often 
poor quality of workmanship and finish. Two of the group, however, praised a recent housing 
development in south-west Moscow, Cheremushki, actively being promoted to Soviet 
citizens as a showpiece (Edmonds, 1958: 114-7; Wright, 1958; Smith, 2010: 115-6). The 
visitors particularly appreciated the slightly lower buildings and greater informality of the site 




The common tendency towards nationalistic narcissism during international 
interactions of this kind was also apparent. Greatest interest was shown in those aspects most 
related to British experiences. Outstanding in this respect were the proposed new Soviet 
satellite towns, particularly the intention that they would have more lower rise dwellings 
including houses with gardens. The debt these proposals owed the British New Towns was 
readily acknowledged by their hosts (and examining these had featured strongly on the first 
leg of the exchange in 1957). Osborn and Wells, both heavily involved in the British New 
Towns, were especially proud of this connection and reported it widely on their return 
(Osborn, 1958a, 1958b; Wells, 1959). 
Conversely however the perceived relevance of what was seen in the USSR to British 
experience directly affected how much attention it received. In 1936, Ernest Simon found 
Moscow far better equipped to tackle metropolitan planning problems than London or any 
other major city in the world. In the final paragraph  of Moscow in the Making, after making 
several important caveats, he expressed his belief that ten years on, Moscow would be well 
on the way to being  ‘the best planned great city the world has ever known’ (Simon et al., 
1937: 234). Although war prevented his prediction being realised, Simon was in 1945 still 
referring to Moscow as ‘the planner’s paradise’ (Simon, 1945: 129-33). 
The Soviet combination of boldness, commitment, comprehensiveness and emphasis 
on a scientific and rational approach in planning and governance appealed to those in 1930s 
Britain advocating a new and stronger form of national territorial planning. Fabians such as 
the Simons and Robson were prominent in making these arguments but a widening coalition 
of interests was also sympathetic. There was mounting acceptance in progressive and left-
wing circles that a more statist approach was appropriate with stronger commitment to 
economic as well as spatial and physical planning.  This gave a particular salience to Soviet 
experience which grew as war produced both a much larger state sector and stronger 
commitment to a more planned post-war Britain. 
A key facet of this Soviet boldness in urban planning was the complete absence of 
private land ownership and a capitalist land market, something which appealed greatly to 
Ernest Simon (Simon et al., 1937: 211-3). It meant that land, far from being itself a 
commodity, became a neutral platform without market value onto which a city that was 
functionally efficient and conducive to human welfare might be redrawn. Many admired 
aspects of Soviet urban planning at that time derived from this. Roads could be drastically 
widened as necessary, buildings moved, historic monuments spared commercial despoliation 
and living areas co-ordinated with social provision and employment areas. Thus Moscow 
planners could raise the level of the Moskva River by 3 metres without fear of compensation 
claims from riparian occupiers. Such occupiers (amongst them the British Embassy) lost their 
basements, a significant amount of space, yet were obliged simply to make the best of it. 
Ernest Simon reported this with amused approval because it showed that, without obstructive 
private interests, planning really could do things. He wished to see bolder action by urban 




By 1958, however, Britain had changed. After becoming a very statist economy 
during the 1940s, it had in the 1950s shifted towards a more ‘mixed economy’, where market 
processes, not least in urban development, had been significantly restored. The result was that 
the features that made Soviet planning admirable in the 1930s no longer held the same 
appeal. In general, the 1958 visitors found relatively little within Soviet urban planning that 
they might wish to emulate in Britain. The obvious cherishing of major historic buildings was 
one aspect they could still genuinely endorse. Soviet planning’s overall scale might also still 
be admired but less unequivocally than in the 1930s. Mere knowledge of it was fascinating 
but the transferable value of that knowledge in relation to British urban planning had 
declining appeal in the 1950s. Wells was merely the most forthright of the 1958 visitors when 
he told the Chartered Surveyors that: ‘In general, the Russians have nothing to teach us on 
principles of town planning.’ (Wells, 1959: 378). 
Conclusions 
Overall therefore, this paper shows how cross-national specialist visits give valuable insights 
into communication and learning between countries, particularly where the cultural and 
ideological ‘gap’ was as great as that between Western countries and the Soviet Union. The 
mere fact of such contacts, especially exchange visits, had symbolic and quasi-diplomatic 
value, a way of proving mutual good will, especially after the 1955 changes when British 
government fears about ideological subversion of visitors were largely assuaged. In other 
respects, the political and cultural contexts for both visits also differed. While the 1936 party 
was eager to learn from Soviet experience, the balance had shifted by 1957-8. Britain had 
turned away from the quasi-Soviet statist solutions favoured in the 1940s and now there was 
greater Soviet eagerness for Western lessons.  Yet while British professional interest 
dwindled, interest in ‘ordinary’ Soviet life burgeoned. Reading the 1958 accounts, it is 
striking how they commented on everyday Soviet life. How Soviet people dressed, how they 
enjoyed their free time, how much they liked ice cream and other small details appear, even 
in articles in professional journals.  It underlined just how much the Soviet Union remained to 
most Westerners an unknown land and the status that might be gained by having seen it.  
The visits still had specific roles in cross-national learning, even though its 
significance varied. The present study has only been able to investigate one side of the story. 
Yet the limited insights presently available into Russian sources suggest that Soviet foreign 
visitors in the 1950s produced findings closely reflecting already endorsed perspectives. So 
too British learning on Soviet visits was the more valued when it spoke to current or evolving 
perspectives, though not necessarily those yet officially endorsed. In some cases, such as 
Simon’s admiration of state land ownership, Soviet experience buttressed a growing counter-
argument to shift the balance of public to private interest in the British planning system. 
A further point to stress is organisational. The exchange arrangements introduced in 
the 1950s encouraged personal contacts and thus a less formal, stronger kind of 
communication.  Also of particular importance in urban planning was its reliance on 
communication forms other than written or verbal communication. Using plans, models and 
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site visits was very important in this. Since these were methods familiar to planners in all 
countries, sharing them was a further way of identifying with the other’s experience.  
Over time more visiting groups had these experiences, certainly improving Anglo-
Soviet communication in the urban planning field. Yet relations were never normalised so as 
to be indistinguishable from those between planners in different Western countries. Moreover 
from the early 1960s British planners referred more to the United States than to the Soviet 
Union and by the 1990s were looking increasingly to Western Europe. That sense that the 
USSR was a ‘planner’s paradise’ peaked in the 1930s and 1940s. It seemed in the later 1950s 
as if it might have a somewhat different salience but this did not last long. British visits 
continued intermittently, yet more for their symbolic and quasi-diplomatic role or as touristic 
quests for a different experience. Any real expectation that they might furnish answers to the 
professional concerns of British planners had largely gone.  
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